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HARM, SHARM, AND ONE EXTREMELY CREEPY
ARGUMENT: A REPLY TO MARK C. MURPHY
Kenneth Einar Himma

In a recent essay appearing in this journal, I argued that, even on the
assumption that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception, a
Christian can consistently hold that while abortion is always murder, it
ought to be legally permitted. On the assumption that the ultimate fate of
moral innocents is eternal bliss, abortion, I argued, does not result in the
sort of harm that ought to be legally prohibited under certain principles of
moral legitimacy. Mark C. Murphy published a response to this essay in
which he disputes my argument that abortion does not, under such an
assumption, result in harm. In this brief essay, I reply to his criticism.

In “No Harm, No Foul: Abortion and the Implications of Fetal Innocence,”1
I argued against the view that the core tenets of Christianity entail a prolife position on whether abortion should be legal. In particular, I argued
that, even if we assume that the fetus is a person from the moment of conception and hence that abortion is always murder, “a Christian can coherently hold that abortion should be legally permitted” (172). In essence, I
attempted to show that the following set of claims is a consistent set: (1) the
core tenets of Christianity are true; (2) the fetus is a moral person from the
moment of conception; and (3) abortion should not be criminalized.
The argument rested on two assumptions that, as far as I can tell, are
consistent with Christianity’s core tenets. The first assumption is that
Mill’s Harm Principle (or something like it) correctly defines the limits of
morally legitimate lawmaking authority; and the second is that the ultimate fate of someone incapable of culpability is heaven. Since fetuses are
incapable of culpability, aborted fetuses do not have to face a life in which
there is a substantial risk of going to hell. While a self-interested being
would regard the loss of an earthly life as harm, a Pascalian-like calculation
shows that the expected value to the fetus of being aborted is a positive
infinite value while the expected value to the fetus of not being aborted is a
negative infinite value. Accordingly, I concluded that abortion does not
harm the fetus and hence, under the Harm Principle, abortion should be
legally permitted.
In an interesting and nuanced response, Mark C. Murphy argues I am
incorrect in thinking that abortion does not harm the fetus.2 He argues,
quite plausibly, that the infinite benefit of eternal life is not the causal result
of the abortion. Since it is instead the causal result of God’s graciousness, it
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misdescribes the situation to claim that abortion doesn’t harm the fetus.
Murphy illustrates the point as follows:
If, for example, a traveler is beaten and left for dead by robbers, is rescued by a Samaritan, and by this transformative experience comes to
have a much better life than he or she would otherwise have had, it is
nevertheless incorrect to say that the robbers did not harm, or even
benefited, the traveler. The robbers merely harmed the traveler; the
Samaritan benefited the traveler (241).
By analogy, then, God benefits the aborted fetus, whereas abortion harms it.
There is, however, a crucial difference between the two examples.
There was no guarantee that the Samaritan would act such as to benefit the
traveler; no matter how resolute the Samaritan’s commitment to helping
people might be, it is always possible for a free human agent to fail to satisfy her own commitments. Thus, even if we knew that (1) the Samaritan
would appear at the crime scene and that (2) the traveler would have a
transformative response to being rescued, we have no reason to think it is
inevitable, in any meaningful sense, that the Samaritan will rescue the traveler. Though it might be very unlikely that the Samaritan would refrain
from doing so, it is nonetheless possible.
This is not true of God’s decisions and commitments. If God has
resolved to confer eternal bliss upon moral innocents who die, eternal bliss
is the inevitable fate of persons who die before becoming capable of culpability. On the assumption that God has made such a decision, no person
who dies incapable of culpability will experience any other fate. Indeed,
there is no logically possible world in which a perfect God has made such a
decision and acted contrary to that decision in any single instance.
Normally, the assessment of whether an act is, on balance, harmful or
not takes into account, at the very least, all the consequences that are
causally inevitable. Although a preventive mastectomy has consequences
that would otherwise be characterized as harms, the procedure is not properly characterized as harmful – when performed in someone with an
abnormally high risk of developing breast cancer – because it inevitably
results in the benefit of precluding breast cancer. Since, on balance, the
caused benefits to the patient significantly outweigh the caused harms
(which may include a period of clinically significant depression), the procedure is, as a conceptual matter, properly characterized as beneficial – and
not as harmful.
It would, of course, be misleading to characterize any person’s ultimate
fate as having been caused by the behaviors of any other agent, and this
distinguishes the preventive mastectomy case from the case in which God
confers eternal life upon moral innocents. But it is not clear this is a significant difference as far as our conceptual practices are concerned. If the fact
that preventive mastectomy precludes the development of breast cancer in
a patient is what explains why we characterize it as not harmful, then any
act that precludes a person’s experiencing any other ultimate fate than
heaven is also plausibly characterized as not harmful.
Murphy believes there is another important difference between the two
cases. Whereas the explanation of why preventive mastectomy precludes
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breast cancer does not include reference to some intervening act of a free
agent, the explanation of why the ultimate fate of moral innocents is eternal bliss does; it is clearly God’s voluntary graciousness that explains this
arrangement. As Murphy puts the point, “[the view] that the causal chain
from act to effect is broken by the intervention of a free agent is the standard view, both in common sense’s attribution of responsibility and in the law’s”
(241; emphasis added).
It seems to me that this analysis conflates two questions: (1) the conceptual question of whether an act A is properly characterized as harmful; and
(2) the normative question of whether the agent should be blamed or punished for A. As a logical matter, it is clear that these are two different
issues. Conceptual issues are generally resolved by a logical analysis of the
conventional linguistic practices of the relevant community without
recourse to normative moral or legal principles. Normative issues simply
cannot be resolved without recourse to substantive normative moral or
legal principles.
Although agents are usually held accountable3 for harmful acts and not
held accountable for beneficial acts, this is not always true. To see that the
conceptual and normative assessments sometimes come apart, consider a
case in which a physician performs a preventive mastectomy on a patient
at very high risk for a particularly malignant form of breast cancer without
her consent. Even on the far-fetched assumption that the patient does not
feel aggrieved by the act, the doctor is still morally responsible for having
performed an act that is morally wrong – even though it is properly characterized as beneficial.
As far as our conceptual and moral practices are concerned, it is uncontroversial only that the intervening act of a free agent insulates the performer of some preceding act from moral responsibility for the consequences; it is not uncontroversial that the intervening act of a free agent
necessarily figures into whether a preceding act should be characterized as
harmful/beneficial. Here it is important to recall that I did not argue that,
under the assumptions that the ultimate fate of moral innocents is eternal
bliss and that the fetus is a moral person from the moment of conception,
that someone who has or performs an abortion should get moral credit for
the ultimate fate of the aborted fetus. On the contrary, I explicitly acknowledged that if the fetus is a moral person from the moment of conception,
abortion is a serious moral wrong: “No matter how much benefit may
accrue to the fetus and how benign the mother’s motive in having an abortion, abortion remains a sin against God” (182) – one that provides “a conclusive moral motive not to have an abortion” (182; emphasis added).
Strictly speaking, however, the argument does not depend on whether I
am correct about our conceptual practices or not. I could simply respond
by defining a new concept and reformulating the Harm Principle to
include that concept in the following way. First, define sharm as follows:
act a is sharmful to another person P if and only if a harms P and a does not
make logically inevitable some benefit that would, from the standpoint of
P’s self-interest, infinitely outweigh the harm to P from a. Second, define
the Sharm Principle as follows: the state may legitimately criminalize only
those acts that are sharmful to others. Under the Sharm Principle and the
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other assumptions I make in my essay, it seems to follow that abortion
should be legally permitted.
Anticipating this move, Murphy argues that a Christian could not
accept (or advocate) this position without presumptuousness. If, for example, Teacher can prevent Bully from beating up 6-year-old Victim but
decides against doing so on the grounds that she knows that Victim’s uncle
will deposit $1,000 into Victim’s account every time Victim is beaten and
that Victim in the long run will regard the benefit as outweighing the
harm, Teacher would nonetheless be wrong to do so:
[Teacher] would in that case be deeply presumptuous, relying on the
Victim’s uncle to compensate for the harm suffered by Victim.… In
relying on God to compensate for the harm done to innocent unborn
children, refusing to protect them from harm when they could be
protected from harm, we are presumptuous with respect to God’s willingness to bestow abundant blessings upon us. And that is something no reasonable Christian could advocate (242).
While Murphy is correct in characterizing the teacher as presumptuous,
I think there is a morally significant difference between the two cases. The
reason Teacher’s behavior is presumptuous is that she has taken it upon
herself to subject the Victim to a serious risk on the basis of her own beliefs
about Victim’s uncle; no matter how well Teacher may think she knows
Victim’s uncle and no matter how justified her beliefs may be, it is always
possible that Victim’s uncle changes his mind. But, on the assumption that
a perfect God has decided to confer eternal life upon moral innocents, the
person advocating that the law allow abortions is not subjecting fetuses to
any analogous risks: as I indicated above, if this assumption is true, then
there is no logically possible world in which some moral innocent experiences any other ultimate fate. The person who relies on God’s perfection
exhibits no presumptuousness with respect to God’s willingness to bestow
abundant blessings upon us – any more than someone who tells nonbelievers that a fully Christian life will result in eternal bliss exhibits such
presumptuousness.
Nevertheless, I share Murphy’s evident discomfort with the argument
and acknowledged as much in the paper. Since I continue to experience
discomfort with the argument, I hope the reader will indulge me if I repeat
some of what I said there:
The reader may be heartened to know that, while I find this line of
reasoning quite interesting, I am also made extremely uncomfortable
by it. Though it is hard for me to pinpoint exactly what is bothering
me about the argument (since I find all of the premises extremely
plausible), my emotional response leads me away from it as a frontline defense of abortion rights (189).
In any event, Murphy’s response convinces me that my discussion did
not clearly distinguish between two very different claims: (1) a Christian
can reasonably adopt such a position; and (2) a Christian can coherently
adopt such a position. While (2) expresses only a point about the logical
consistency of a pro-choice view with the central tenets of Christianity, (1)

254

Faith and Philosophy

expresses a point about the ethical acceptability of advocating such a view.
In particular, (1) asserts that a Christian can advocate such a view without
violating any of her ethical commitments.
The creepy feeling the argument evokes in me is undoubtedly an ethical
reaction; any argument that purports to show that the state should allow
some form of murder ought to produce a deep and recurring shudder.
While this reaction prevents me from advocating a pro-choice position on
the strength of the argument, it is not a reliable indicator that something is
wrong with it. If (1) the Sharm Principle correctly describes the limits of
what may be legitimately criminalized and (2) the ultimate fate of moral
innocents is eternal bliss, then it follows that it would be illegitimate to
criminalize abortion – even on the assumption that abortion is always murder. The creepy feel of all this tells us nothing about whether the premises
and conclusions of the argument are logically consistent with the core of
Christianity.
I am not sure that this unfortunate quality is even a reliable indicator
that one cannot advocate such a position without violating Christian ethics.
If the assumptions above are correct and consistent with the core tenets of
Christianity (construed to include the fundaments of Christian ethics), then
the conclusion is also consistent with those tenets. And if the conclusion is
consistent with the fundaments of Christian ethics, then a Christian can
advocate that position without violating any ethical commitments.
It is important to remember that the issue is whether the state should put
its police power behind a law that criminalizes abortion – and not whether
abortion is immoral. The issue of legitimacy is concerned with the conditions under which one group of morally autonomous people is justified in
coercively restricting the freedom of another group of morally autonomous
people. To my knowledge, no mainstream theorist, Christian or otherwise,
holds that all and only immoral behaviors should be criminalized; this
would imply, absurdly, that all broken promises should be criminalized.
Accordingly, all mainstream theorists are committed to the view that some
immoral behaviors ought not to be criminalized; and part of what a theory
of legitimacy is designed to do is to distinguish those immoralities that are
justifiably criminalized from those that are not. To deny that a behavior
should be criminalized, then, is not to deny that it is immoral – or even to
deny that it is horrible from the standpoint of morality.
Indeed, someone who passionately advocates that abortion should not
be criminalized on the strength of the argument I make could also passionately advocate – without incoherence or inconsistency – that no woman
should ever have an abortion. Under the assumption that the fetus is a
person from the moment of conception, the intentional termination of a
pregnancy is, from the standpoint of morality, indistinguishable from
intentionally shooting an innocent adult; such an act is among the worst
that any human being can commit and commits a grievous wrong against
its victim. Further, under these assumptions, abortion is also a grievous
sin against God. For these reasons, someone who grounds a pro-choice
position on this argument could also passionately advocate against persons exercising their legal right to abortion.
Still, I want to point out that there is one good reason for not grounding
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a pro-choice position in such considerations: the assumption about the ultimate fate of moral innocents is not obviously true. While I find it hard to
imagine that any other fate is consistent with God’s moral perfection, I recognize that this does not amount to an argument. The possibility that this
claim might be false, I think, is a very good reason not to advocate a prochoice position on the strength of the argument I made. But, as far as I can
tell, the argument nonetheless shows that the core tenets of Christianity do
not logically entail any particular position on whether abortion should be
criminalized and hence that it is logically open to Christians to take a liberal
position on this issue (something that is undoubtedly true of other controversial issues). And this point is important enough, on my view, to justify
drafting one extremely creepy argument.
University of Washington
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